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I. Introduction 
The economy of Ghana has persistently declined since the early 1960s. GDP 
declined at the rate of 1.3 percent between 1960 and 1982. By 1983, the rate of 
inflation had climbed to 123 percent. Food production also declined over the 
years, while the population was growing at a staggering 3.2 percent. All these 
factors meant economic hardship for the country. Balance of payment difficul- 
ties and shortage of foreign exchange also meant low industrial output. Most in- 
dustries in Ghana were operating greatly below capacity prior to 1986. 
A number of factors could account for this poor performance. One of the main 
ones is thought to be policy-induced distortions in the economy. It was therefore 
felt that through appropriate exchange-rate, fiscal, monetary, trade and payments 
policies these distortions could be removed, creating a structure that would 
favour the productive sectors of the economy. This was the basis of the 
economic recovery programme initiated in April 1983 and planned to continue 
to at least 1992. 
This is not the first time that Ghana has undertaken such programmes. In re- 
sponse to similar conditions in 1967, 1971/72 and 1978, a similar set of 
Bank/Fund-supported programmes was initiated. However, on each occasion the 
programmes lasted for a very short time. Ghana's first military regime, the 
National Liberation Council (NLC), followed an IMP adjustment programme for 
two years (1967 to 1969). The current programme, which began in 1983, has 
been the longest and most persistent. Indeed, very few countries can boast of 
having assiduously followed an IMF programme for so long. It is no wonder that 
Ghana has become a "pet" of the Fund and the Bank, and has received all six 
facilities under the Fund's structural adjustment programme. 
The initial years of the programme produced a dramatic change in the 
Ghanaian economy which caught the attention of the whole world. The down- 
ward trend in the economy was reversed; gross national output, which had been 
declining throughout the 1970s, started to show signs of growth, inflation was 
lowered and the country's balance of payments showed promise of a recovery. 
Whereas the timing of this recovery coincided with the initiation of the ad- 
justment programme, recognition should also be given to some natural factors, 
particularly the weather. In other words, the issue of causality between the ad- 
justment measures and the recent "recovery" of the Ghanaian economy has not 
been fully established. 
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A central issue in the economic recovery programme (ERP), is the removal of 
distortions in the economy which had prevented the proper allocation of re- 
sources. These distortions were exacerbated by government interventions in sev- 
eral sectors of the economy. Price controls increased activities in the parallel 
markets, including foreign exchange. 
As part of the measures taken under the adjustment programme, trade was lib- 
eralized, price controls were removed and exchange rate reforms were intro- 
duced. 
Ghana has an import-constrained economy. The country's foreign exchange 
earning is dependent on the export of a few primary products—basically cocoa, 
gold and timber. Most development activities hinge on the availability of im- 
ports. In such an import-constrained economy exchange rate policies are very 
important in the performance of the economy. 
Exchange rate policy has been an important component of orthodox 
stabilization programmes. Devaluation has been the consistent policy used in 
Ghana since 1967. It is supposed to lead to expenditure switching, increased 
production of tradables, higher exports, lower imports and, consequently, an 
improved external payments position for the country. Such measures in other 
developing countries have had mixed results. In some cases, real devaluations 
have been found to be contractionary. Such contractionary effects could happen 
through a negative real balance effect (Frenkel and Johnson, 1976) or through 
redistribution of income (Diaz-Alejandro, 1965; Krugman and Taylor, 1978). 
On the supply side, real devaluation may also lead to recessionary shifts in 
aggregate supply (Van Wijnbergen, 1986). Other studies by Gylfason and 
Radetzki (1985) and Branson (1986) also found real devaluations to have 
contractionary effects. 
On the other hand, real devaluation could also lead to expansionary effects 
(Gylfason and Schmidt, 1983; Katseli, 1983; Buffie, 1984; Hanson, 1983; 
Connolly, 1983; Taylor and Rosensweig, 1984; Krueger, 1978; and Cooper, 
1971). 
This paper seeks to examine the effect of various exchange rate policies on 
the economy of Ghana. In particular, it addresses itself to the effect of adjust- 
ments in the exchange rate on growth of the economy—both sectoral and global, 
exports and imports. 
Section II presents an analysis of the various exchange rate policies Ghana 
has had since independence. Special attention is given to the ERP period since 
the exchange rate seems to have gone through more changes under this regime. 
Section III analyses the recent performance of the economy using the basic 
available data without attributing any causality. In Section IV an attempt is made 
to model the relationship between macroeconomic performance and changes in 
the real exchange rate. Section V presents the empirical results. 
Recommendations and conclusions follow in the last section. 
II. Exchange rate policy in Ghana 
The Pre-ERP period 
Prior to the advent of the Economic Recovery Programme, Ghana's exchange 
rate policy had involved the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate with 
occasional devaluations. This passive attitude towards exchange rate 
management was one of the factors which led to the crisis in the Ghanaian 
economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
At independence, Ghana had accumulated external reserves of about $269 
million. The Nkrumah government, which took over from the British, engaged 
in massive development and modernization projects. A social and economic in- 
frastructure was established, and some import substituting industries were set 
up. These projects started at a time when cocoa, the country's chief foreign ex- 
change earner, was in a boom. Soon after these projects had begun, the price of 
cocoa started to fall; the London price declined from US$ 977 per tonne in 1958 
to an all-time low of US$ 400 per tonne in 1965, and continued falling. By 1972, 
the price of cocoa had still not returned to its 1958 level. The falling price of co- 
coa led to a fall in Ghana's external and internal revenues. As early as 1961, the 
country's reserve position had become precarious. Pressure from the IMF and 
the World Bank for the country to accept an orthodox stabilization policy, in- 
cluding devaluation, was rejected, and Ghana continued to maintain an overval- 
ued fixed-exchange rate. 
Ghana was the first country in the West African Currency Union to disengage 
herself from the West African Currency Board and form its own central bank, 
the Bank of Ghana. Tn November 1958, the country introduced a new currency, 
the Ghana pound which was set at par with the British pound sterling, then 
exchanging for US$ 2.80. On 19 July 1965, the pound was decimalized and a 
new name, "cedi" was introduced. The external value of the cedi was established 
at Cl = US$ 1.166. This decimalization was not accompanied by a change in the 
external value of the Ghana currency. The Ghana pound was formally 
demonetized on 17 December 1966. 
After the NLC coup of 1966, the basis of the currency unit was changed from 
8s 4d to lOs. In other words the smallest currency unit in Ghana, the "pesewa" 
was valued greater than the British penny. 
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On 23 February 1967, a new currency, known as the new cedi (NC), was 
established at NC1 = US$ 1.166. The new cedi exchanged with the old at the 
rate of NC1.00 = 1.20, and the external value of the new cedi was fixed at US$ 
1.00 = NC 0.714. This change in the monetary unit did not lead to a revaluation 
of the currency. Later the prefix "new" was dropped from the name. 
By the time the National Liberation Council government took over from 
Nkrumah, the economy was thought to have declined to its lowest level. Exports 
were at best stagnant and imports scarce. There were shortages of some consum- 
ables—especially milk and sugar. Most factories were producing below capacity 
because of lack of raw materials. Growth rate in per capita GDP had remained 
negative for four consecutive years since 1964. The NLC government accepted 
the IMF and World Bank economic package and on 8 July 1967 Ghana had its 
first official devaluation of the cedi. The par value of the new cedi was set at 
US$ 1.00 = Cl .02, a devaluation of about 30 percent. With the support of both 
the Fund and the Bank, credit facilities were extended to the government and 
this momentarily eased the import pressure that the Nkrumah government had 
faced. 
Up to 1971, Ghana's currency had remained pegged to sterling. Yet in 
November 1967, when the pound sterling was devalued,1 Ghana like many other 
sterling area countries, did not devalue her currency. 
As a result of increasing balance of payments difficulties, depletion of foreign 
reserves and a build-up of uncleared short-term debts, in December 1971 the 
Busia government devalued the currency again, this time by 44 percent to a par 
value of C1.82 US$ 1.00. The cedi was later revalued to C1.28 = US$ 1.00. 
The coup d état in January 1972 resulted in a real depreciation of the currency 
by 25 percent. However, from 1973 the currency started appreciating and 
continued to do so up to 1978, largely as a result of rising government deficits 
and inflation. 
In June 1978, Ghana introduced a flexible exchange system under which the 
exchange rate for the cedi in terms of the US dollar was to be adjusted to reflect 
the underlying economic, financial, and balance of payments situation. Such ad- 
justments were discontinued in August 1978 when the rate of exchange was 
fixed at C2.75 = US$ 1.00. This was the rate inherited by the Provisional 
National Defence Council (PNDC). The real exchange rate depreciated in 1979 
and continued the appreciation from 1980 to 1982, as shown in Table 1 and 
Figure 1. 
The ERP period 
The "adjustment era" has been characterized by massive reforms in exchange 
rate policy. The country has moved from the fixed exchange rate regime of the 
pre-adjustment period to a regime of "managed float" in which rates are deter- 
mined at weekly auctions. 
In April 1983, as a harbinger to the Economic Recovery Programme to be in- 
troduced a few months later, a system of multiple exchange rates based on 
bonuses and surcharges applied to specified transactions was tried and aban- 
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doned. In October 1983, the exchange rate system was unified at the rate of C30 
= US$1. During 1985, the exchange rate of the cedi was adjusted three times, 
culminating in a rate of C60:US$1. In January 1986, the exchange rate was 
again adjusted to C90 = US$1, representing a depreciation of 33.3 percent 
In September 1986 the government of the Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC) introduced an auction system for determining exchange rates. 
These rates were to be determined by "market forces" through biddings. 
The auction system started with two "windows"—Window 1 for official 
transactions and Window 2 for all other transactions. Initially, transactions 
through Window 1 were allowed at the fixed exchange rate of C90 to the dollar. 
In February 1987, however, the two windows were merged and all foreign trans- 
actions were made at the auction-determined marginal rates.2 
Table 1 Trends in the real exchange rate in Ghana, 1970—1 988 
Year XR NEER REER MUV XUV TOT 
1970 1.02 279.67 27.73 24.36 42.81 1.76 
1971 1.03 274.88 28.73 25.66 34.25 1.33 
1972 1.33 205.68 21.84 27.91 32.53 1.17 
1973 1.17 222.09 25.43 33.52 45.19 1.35 
1974 1.15 230.67 27.07 48.37 61.56 1.27 
1975 1.15 229.30 30.37 54.13 65.49 1.21 
1976 1.15 249.65 46.20 54.40 62.21 1.14 
1977 1.15 251.85 89.57 59.86 93.65 1.56 
1978 1.76 182.14 101.73 67.03 113.95 1.70 
1979 2.75 98.88 75.44 80.16 119.84 1.50 
1980 2.75 100.11 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00 
1981 2.75 115.71 221.48 99.18 82.78 0.83 
1982 2.75 131.29 277.67 95.52 65.42 0.68 
1983 8.83 56.77 242.99 90.60 65.62 0.72 
1984 35.99 13.52 72.27 87.92 83.10 0.95 
1985 54.37 9.78 52.23 85.58 76.56 0.89 
1986 89.20 4.93 30.54 94.74 82.78 0.87 
1987 153.73 3.15 25.13 103.99 84.28 0.81 
1988 202.35 2.42 20.46 108.31 82.97 0.77 
Source: IMF data. 
Notes: XR: Exchange rate (C/$) 
NEER: Nominal effective exchange * 
IREER: Real effective rate (1980 = 100)* 
MUV: Import unit value (1980 = 100) 
XUV: Export unit value (1980 = 100) 
TOT: Terms of trade (XUV/MUV) 
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Initially, the rate seemed to be approaching the fairly stable parallel market 
rate. For instance, at the start of the auction the marginal rate was C128 per 
dollar as against C200 on the parallel market. Two weeks later, the rate on the 
parallel market dropped while the marginal rate on the auction kept rising. 
However, after the accumulated rent elements in the parallel rates had been 
eaten up by the rise in the auction rates, the former started to rise again. The 
continued operation of the parallel market prompted the government to legislate 
the setting up of purely private market-oriented foreign exchange bureaux. The 
first bureau was established in February 1988. 
The establishment of the forex bureaux and the other trade and payments 
policies3 brought in since the Economic Recovery Programme, liberalized the 
foreign exchange market, and consequently enhanced the government's trade 
liberalization policies. 
These policies have resulted in the continuous depreciation of the real ex- 
change rate from 243 in 1983 to 20 in 1988 (1980 = 100). 
III. Recent macroeconomic 
performance 
Growth in GDP 
The ERP/SAP has contributed in reversing the negative growth rate in GDP 
throughout the 1970s and the early part of the 1980s. For the first time in a long 
period, real GDP recorded a positive rate of growth of 8.96 percent in 1984. For 
the entire period 1984—1988, GDP recorded an average annual growth rate of 5 
percent (Table 2). All sectors had positive growth, while within sectors, utilities 
and manufacturing showed the highest growth rates. The performance of utilities 
and manufacturing could be explained by the dramatic increases in the charges 
to utility users and the rehabilitated manufacturing capacity. It is only construc- 
tion and mining which registered negative growth rates of 2.6 percent and 3 per- 
cent, respectively, in 1986. 
Table 2 Growth of GDP by kind of economic activity at constant 1975 prices 
(percent) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Agriculture 2.17 —2.56 —3.25 —9.11 9.71 0.65 3.31 0.04 
Industry —1.85 —14.46 —16.67 —6.77 11.94 17.60 7.56 11.34 
Services —2.79 2.73 —4.65 4.54 6.63 7.52 6.50 9.38 
Total GDP —0.23 —3.18 —5.85 —4.34 8.96 5.09 5.20 4.80 
Source: Calculated from data obtained from IMF Financial Statistics and Quarterly Digest of 
Statistics, GSS, Accra, several years. 
An examination of the sectoral sources of growth shows that over the 1984— 
1987 period, total aggregate growth rates for industry, services and agriculture 
were 48 percent, 30 percent and 14 percent respectively (Table 2). Industry 
recorded the highest growth, albeit starting from a low base. 
It is important to take into consideration the relative importance of each sector 
to the GDP. Table 3 shows the percentage contribution of various sectors to 
GDP growth. In 1984, due basically to good rains, maize production alone in- 
creased by 42 percent. This resulted in agriculture providing more than 50 per- 
cent of the growth in GDP, followed by services and industry in order of impor- 
tance. 
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Table 3 Percentage contribution of sectors to 
GDP Growth 
1984 1985 1986 1987 
Agriculture 57.25 5.42 31.48 0.39 
Industry 15.15 42.81 18.86 32.43 
Services 26.98 53.71 46.95 67.56 
Source: Calculated from GSS, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, 
various issues. 
Note: The figures do not add upto 100 in certain cases 
because of rounding. 
In subsequent years, however, the growth rate of non-cocoa agricultural pro- 
duction (food crops, livestock) declined drastically, while that of cocoa produc- 
tion increased, resulting in a decrease in overall agricultural production. This 
decline led to a fall in agriculture's contribution to GDP growth. Meanwhile, 
services maintained their growth and increased their contribution to over 60 per- 
cent of GDP growth in 1987, with industry making up 30 percent. Thus, with 
this approach, it can be seen that a major part of the growth can be explained by 
the growth in services. 
Gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP increased from 4.0 to 10.8 
between 1980—1983 and 1987, as can be seen from Table 4. Non-traded goods, 
such as buildings, which had the largest share of gross fixed capital formation, 
reached their highest level at 5.0, but fell to 4.0 in 1987, while traded goods like 
transport and machinery have increased continuously since 1980. The ratio of 
non-traded capital to traded capital fell from 2.8 during the period 1980—1983 to 
0.7 in 1987. This shows a movement away from less expensive non-traded capi- 
tal to more expensive traded goods. 
Table 4 National savings and gross capital formation as percent of 
GDP in purchaser's value (market prices) 
1980—83 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Grosscapitaltormation 4.0 6.9 9.6 9.7 10.8 
Buildings 2.8 3.9 5.0 4.1 4.0 
Transport equipment 0.5 1.3 1.2 1.8 2.3 
Machinery 0.5 1.3 2.3 2.8 3.4 
National savings 3.9 4.0 5.4 5.5 5.9 
Public a —4.4 —0.6 0.1 1.7 3.3 
Private b 8.3 4.6 5.4 3.7 2.7 
Foreign saving 0.6 2.8 4.2 4.2 4.9 
Sources: World Bank Staff Estimates, Statistical Service, Accra, Quarterly Digest of 
Statistics, December 1987, June 1988. 
a. Represents Central Government's savings only. 
b. Includes state enterprises. 
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To explain the increase in capital formation, the behaviour of national and 
foreign savings is important. National savings increased from an average of 3.9 
percent of GDP between 1980 and 1983 to 5.9 percent while foreign savings 
also registered progressive increases over the years. Between 1980 and 1984, 
private savings were the main factor behind the increasing national savings. 
While public savings began to grow from 1986, private savings declined. 
Several explanations can be given for the decline in private saving. In the first 
place, a positive outlook for the future economic situation makes permanent in- 
come greater than current income. Individuals basing their consumption ex- 
penditures on permanent income dissave in order to maintain their level of ex- 
penditures. Secondly, the economic recovery has led to the availability of goods 
and services. In order to maintain past standards of living, individuals dissave 
because current income cannot meet current consumption expenditures. Thirdly, 
an increase in the cost of services such as utilities, education and health, implies 
a higher financial burden on families and hence a reduction in private savings. 
An effective tax collection procedure, coupled with restraint on government ex- 
penditures, has contributed to the increase in public savings since 1985. 
Balance of payments 
Ghana experienced her fir3t balance of payments crisis in 1961. In that year, cur- 
rent account deficit amounted to 12 percent of GDP. Since then, the balance of 
payments position has remained precarious. The first attempt to tackle the bal- 
ance of payments problem and its squeeze on the economy was in 1967. As 
indicated earlier, the government implemented an orthodox IMF stabilization 
package, including a devaluation of the currency. The balance of payments po- 
sition improved temporarily in 1968 and 1969, but worsened again in 1970 and 
1971 due to declining cocoa prices and increased imports. This forced the gov- 
ernment to devalue the currency in December 1971 with subsequent revaluation 
in 1972 but leaving a net devaluation. There was a positive response on net cur- 
rent account for 1972 and 1973. By 1974 the situation had worsened. 
The 1978 manipulation of the exchange rate resulted in a positive net balance 
on current account for 1979 but the situation worsened again with net current 
account in millions of dollars of —55, —508, and —158 for 1980, 1981 and 1982, 
respectively, as can be seen from Table 5. 
Table 5 Balance of payments 
1970 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Current a/c ($m) —81 —51 +40 —55 —508 —158 —230 —214 —264 —204 —224 
Merchandise ($m): 
Exports ($m) 481 728 1066 1104 711 641 439 567 632 749 827 
Imports ($m) 449 651 882 972 1021 631 539 681 729 805 1012 
Source: World Bank, Ghana: Structural Adjustment for Growth, 1989. 
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The performance of the balance of payments in response to the series of mea- 
sures taken since 1983 seems to follow the same pattern. Following the intro- 
duction of the programme in 1983, the net current account improved in 1984 and 
1986 but worsened in 1985 and 1988 and is projected to deteriorate further in 
1989 and 1990. 
The poor performance is due to the inelastic supply response of cocoa and the 
mining sector. While real cocoa producer prices doubled over the period, cocoa 
output, allowing for weather, increased by only 30 percent. At the same time, the 
availability of foreign loans and the trade liberalization increased import quanti- 
ties, thus creating deficits in the balance of trade, contrary to the past record. 
Inflation 
Until 1964, inflation had not been a problem in Ghana, averaging around 6 per- 
cent per annum. Inflationary pressure began in 1965 with a rate of 22.8 percent. 
This was basically a result of a shrinking in the supply of basic consumer goods 
coupled with a money growth rate of 41 percent. 
However, in the late 1970s inflation became a serious issue. From a rate of 56 
percent in 1976, inflation peaked at 117 percent in 1977 and closed the decade 
with 54 percent. This was a monetary phenomenon because while the GDP 
recorded negative growth rates of 12 percent, 4 percent in 1975 and 1976 
respectively, money supply grew at the rate of 25 percent and 44 percent for 
1974 and 1975, respectively. 
The other peak inflation figure of 123 percent in 1983 is explained by the 
Sahelian drought and the widespread bush fires that destroyed farm produce, 
sharply reducing supply of food and other consumables. Since 1984, the rate of 
inflation has been comparatively moderate. The highest was 40 percent in 1984. 
Although increases in money supply have been considerable, averaging 49 per- 
cent for Ml and 47 percent for M2, the positive GDP growth rate coupled with 
the increased imports of goods and services has dampened the inflationary pro- 
cess. In spite of conscious efforts at reducing the rate of inflation, mainly 
through monetary and fiscal policies, it has remained above target. 
IV. The model 
A number of alternative models are available for modelling the growth of GDP 
in less developed countries (Ndulu, 1990). One of the most common models, 
taking into consideration the constraints to growth in such economies, is the 
three-gap model. In these models, real growth in GDP is conceived as the sum 
of capacity growth (gc) driven by investment and growth in the rate of capacity 
utilization (gn) 
g=gc+gn 
where g is real GDP growth. 
Using this basic relationship, it can be shown that the growth in real output is 
a function of the savings constraint, the foreign exchange constraint, and the fis- 
cal constraint (Ndulu, 1990). 
These models typically sought to explain the medium-to-long-term growth in 
real output. 
However, in the circumstances under which most LDCs undertake 
stabilization programmes, considerable levels of under-utilization exist. In 
Ghana, for instance, at the time of initiating the economic recovery programme, 
capacity utilization rate in industry was about 30 percent. In such circumstances, 
considerable growth in real output can be achieved with the right mix of policies 
without significant increases in capacity growth. The under-utilization of 
capacity may be due to lack of demand or import compression and the 
distortionary influence of such import-control measures. 
In assessing the response of real output to policy changes in such circum- 
stances, the long-term perspective of gaps models may be inappropriate. In this 
paper, therefore, we use a modified version of Khan and Knight's (1981) re- 
duced-form equation for the effect of stabilization policies on aggregate prod1ic- 
tion in developing countries. This attempt was made by Edwards (1986). 
In this paper, we use Edwards' reduced-form equation for real output to esti- 
mate the relations between GDP and the exchange rates. Thus the reduced-form 
equation for our GDP growth is: 
(1) Y(t) = f [M(t), G(t), REER(t), REER(t-1), TOTI 
where Y is growth in GDP 
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0 is the ratio of government expenditure to GDP 
M is unexpected money growth 
TOT is the terms of trade, and 
REER is the real exchange rate variable. 
This equation therefore includes elements of fiscal and monetary policy as well 
as the terms of trade and the exchange rate. The expected growth of money is 
estimated for the following money-generating process and fiscal term: 
(2) M(t) = g[M(t-l), M(t—2),. . . , M(t-n), FD] 
where M(t) is the money supply in year t, and FD is a fiscal deficit term. 
As pointed out in the introduction, the exchange rate may exert a negative or 
positive influence on GDP. If the rational expectation argument is correct, sur- 
prise money growth can be expected to have a positive effect on GDP growth. 
Government expenditure may have a positive or negative sign depending on 
whether its effect is a net crowding in or crowding out. 
In addition to the variables identified in the above model, imports may be a 
significant factor in explaining GDP growth, particularly in the Ghanaian econ- 
omy and less industrialized countries (LIC) in general. The history of the 
Ghanaian economy has shown that the availability of imports may play a signif- 
icant role both in policy decision and performance of the economy. This asser- 
tion is strongly made by Tony Killick (1978) who analyses a number of ways in 
which imports can impinge on the performance of the economy. In this analysis, 
therefore, we include imports (IMP) which are expected to have a positive im- 
pact on GDP. 
The trade sector 
We adopt a partial equilibrium approach for the analysis of the trade sector. 
Emphasis in this analysis is on the effect of the real exchange rate on the trade 
sector. Making the small country assumption implies that on the export side, the 
volume of exports equals the supply. This assumption is applicable to all 
Ghanaian exports except for cocoa in which Ghana is not a price-taker in the 
world market. 
Based on the imperfect substitutes model, the empirical forms of the supply 
and demand functions for exports and imports are fairly well known. On the ex- 
ports side, the standard model (Bond, 1985; Moran, 1988), assumes that produc- 
ers base their decisions on domestic capacity and the relative profitability of 
producing for exports relative to producing home goods. The basic model, there- 
fore, expresses exports as a function of domestic capacity constraint and price 
effects. Domestic capacity may be proxied by trend GDP (y*). The price effects 
are usually matured by two different measures: (a) the real exchange rate which 
indicates the relative profitability of producing tradables relative to non-trad- 
ables, and (b) the ratio of the prices of exports to other domestic tradable goods 
which indicates the relative profitability of producing exports vis a vis other 
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tradables. Thus in the basic model, export supply is specified as 
(3) X(t) = f[(PxIPT)t, (Ph/PT)t, 
where Px = price of exports 
PT = price of domestic tradables 
Ph = price of non-tradables 
= trend in GDP 
t = time 
Khan and Knight (1988) have argued that this standard model may be inap- 
propriate for LICs facing foreign exchange constraints and where export pro- 
duction may rely on imported inputs. This is because the standard model does 
not take into consideration the feedback relations between imports and exports. 
Imports of intermediate and capital goods may be crucial in exports production 
in LICs. At the same time, poor export performance reduces foreign exchange 
availability leading to import compression. 
The extended export supply function may therefore be written as 
(4) X(t) = ff(Px/PT), REER(t), MI(t), 
REER(t) = real exchange rate 
MI = imported inputs 
Using a delayed response according to the following partial-adjustment process: 
(5) log X (t) = k [log Xs(t) - log X(t-1)J, O<k<1 
The reduced form equation in log-linear can be specified as: 
(6) log X(t) = ao + al logIMP(t) + a2 log(PxIPT)t + a3 log REER(t) 
+ a4 logY*(t) + a5 logX(t-l) 
In our analysis, we use the above reduced-form export equation. 
Our import demand function is based on Khan and Knight (1988) except that 
the relative price of imports is replaced by the real exchange rate to reflect the 
emphasis in this paper. The reduced form of the import demand function is 
therefore given as: 
(7) log IMP(t) = bo + bi log Y*(t) + b2 log REER(t) + b3 log Fr(t) + b4 log 
IMP(t- 1) 
where Fr is foreign reserves. 
The model is then completed with the trade balance equation: 
TB = (X.Px)t-(M.Pm)t 
The partial derivatives indicate that exports are positively related to both the 
real exchange rate and GDP. Exchange rate devaluation in Ghana has always 
occurred as part of a package. As a result, these devaluations have been accom- 
panied by substantial external assistance. The 1967, 1971 and 1978 devaluations 
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and the current programme are of that type. External assistance, particularly 
when it is programme aid, improves the availability of foreign exchange and can 
be expected to exert a positive impact on imports. In this analysis, therefore, net 
capital inflow will be incorporated. 
Where the tariff system also changes, the relevant measure of the real ex- 
change rate for export is 
REER(x) = e(l-tx) 
Pd 
and that for imports is 
REER(m) = e(l+tm) 
Pd 
where tx is the export tax and tm is the import duty rate. 
V. Empirical results 
The system of equations in the model is block triangular with the explanatory 
variables in the output and import equations being exogenous. Therefore ordi- 
nary least squares (OLS) was applied to the data set from 1970 to 1988 in order 
to obtain consistent estimates for the parameters of the output and import equa- 
tions. The export and output equations, however, included imports as an ex- 
planatory variable. These equations were, therefore, estimated using, the instru- 
mental variables technique with foreign reserves as an instrument. 
Aggregate output 
Table 6 shows the results of the output equation. The only variables that are 
significant in the equations are the exchange rate and imports. In equation 1, 
only the exchange rate variable is significant and indicates that a real deprecia- 
tion in the currency has an expansionary effect on GDP in the short run. This 
trend is not reversed in the second period since the sign of the lag of the real ex- 
change rate is still negative (eq. 3). The equation is satisfactory in terms of its 
explanatory power and fit. The signs of the other parameters are as expected, but 
the coefficients of the fiscal term, surprise money and the terms of trade are not 
significant. The negative coefficient for time reflects the downward trend in the 
economy for most of the 1970s and the early 1980s. 
Other formulations of the output equation did not yield any significant 
change. When imports were added to the output equation, the results did not 
change much in terms of signs but the real effective exchange rate is no longer 
significant due to the high correlation between them (eq. 2). However, the im- 
ports coefficient became significant when the real exchange rate was dropped 
from the equation. 
It seems from these results that the real devaluation has an expansionary ef- 
fect on the GDP. The results also show the dominance of the external sector in 
explaining the performance of the GDP. Ghana's economy is highly dependent 
on imports. The manufacturing sector depends on imported raw materials and 
capital goods, while the service sector hardly utilizes any domestic resources. 
Even though the level of utilization of imported inputs in agriculture is very low, 
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production in this sector is affected by the high level of imports in the distribu- 
tion system. 
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Surprise money does not seem to have any significant impact on output. This 
could be due to the fact that part of the role of surprise money is picked up by 
government expenditure.4 
Sectoral output 
When the economy is disaggregated into agriculture, industry and services, simi- 
lar results are obtained (Table 7a). Real devaluation and imports continue to 
have an expansionary impact. Government expenditure on agriculture continues 
to be insignificant but is important in industry. Agriculture has traditionally been 
dominated by small-scale farmers with very little government support. On the 
other hand, the positive effect of government expenditure on industry can be 
explained by the role of the state in the industrialization process in Ghana. 
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Parastatal industries comprise a high proportion of the total industrial sector. A 
decrease in government expenditure could affect working capital and purchase 
of inputs, thereby adversely affecting industrial output. The service sector has 
historically been dominated by the non-governmental sector. Government ex- 
penditure, which has traditionally been financed by resort to borrowing from the 
banking system, crowds out private-sector credit. 













































R-barsq. 0.6652 0.9317 0.9749 
F 8.1511 50.1389 140.7683 
DW 1.1024 1.4513 0.6241 
Table 7b replaces the real exchange rate with lagged imports. The results em- 
phasize the importance of the external sector in the Ghanaian economy. It would 
seem from these results that the same output response could be induced from ei- 
ther an exchange rate depreciation or increased imports. There is a tendency, 
therefore, to conclude that external assistance leading to increased imports could 
achieve the same results as exchange rate depreciation. However, increased im- 
ports without the changes in incentive structure and efficiency induced by ex- 
change rate depreciation may not achieve the desired objective. There is a need 
for further analysis on the relative effectiveness of exchange rate and foreign 
assistance vis a vis foreign assistance cum non-exchange rate policies. 
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R-bar sq. 0.7611 0.9259 0.9933 
F 11.8334 22.8544 260.0069 
DW 2.1375 2.4448 2.4949 
Trade sector 
Total exports were disaggregated into cocoa beans and non-cocoa exports be- 
cause of the dominance of cocoa in total exports. The results for non-cocoa ex- 
ports are not reported because they are similar to the results of aggregate 
exports. Like the output and disaggregated sectors, changes in the real exchange 
rate have a positive impact on the aggregate exports (Table 8a). However, for 
cocoa beans the sign of the real exchange rate is mixed and insignificant. 
In the full model, Table 8b (eq. 1), the exchange rate has a positive sign, while 
in the model without cocoa prices (eq. 2) it has a negative sign. This may be due 
to the marketing or pricing system. Cocoa prices are fixed by the marketing 
board which may not pass on the full effect of the exchange rate devaluation to 
producers. 
In conformity with the import compression model, the level of imports tends 
to be important for total exports. However, for cocoa this is not the case. 
Contrary to the results obtained for exports as a whole, imports are not crucial in 
the exports of cocoa beans. This may be due to the low level of imported inputs 
in cocoa production. The other exports such as timber and minerals depend 
heavily on imported inputs. The exchange rate is also not significant in explain- 
ing cocoa exports. This is because, as explained earlier, exchange rate deprecia- 
tion may not be passed on to cocoa farmers in the form of higher domestic 
prices. The most important variables in explaining cocoa exports are the pro- 
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ducer prices of cocoa and the level of economic activity. These results are con- 
sistent with other work done on the cocoa industry in Ghana (Okyere, 1989). 




























































R-bar sq. 0.9842 0.9784 0.9806 0.9845 
F 200.2635 181 .9144 286.7188 360.4997 
DW 1.9395 1.7037 1.6712 1.6781 







C —2.2817 —1.7828 —1.7889 
(—2.3676) (—1.3747) (—1.9923) 
Cpx 0.4182 — 0.3586 
(3.7023) (3.4293) 
IMP 0.1449 0.1215 0.0114 
(1 .2014) (0.7425) (0.1939) 
REER(x) 0.1479 —0.0340 — 
(1.2601) (—0.2348) 
\f* 0.7647 1.0422 0.8934 
(4.0974) (44866) (5.6119) 
R-bar sq. 0.8692 0.7583 0.8640 
F 30.9835 19.8264 39.1285 
DW 1.8672 1.7701 1.9029 
Cocoa (beans). 
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R-barsq. 0.9086 0.7937 0.9109 
F 43.2363 22.8055 44.4629 
DW 2.6319 1.7054 2.2161 
Domestic export and producer prices have a significant and positive effect on 
export volumes, both for aggregate exports and cocoa. However, export unit 
values based on world market prices did not have a significant effect on export 
volumes. Again, this is due to the fact that world market prices may not be 
transmitted to domestic export prices. 
The import equation shows a significant effect of the real exchange rate but 
with the unexpected sign. From our results, real devaluation increases the level 
of imports. This may be due to the fact that the economy is highly dependent on 
imports. Imported inputs are very significant for key sectors such as industry, 
mining and timber. Consequently, an increase in imports in these sectors has a 
positive effect on output. The real devaluations have led to massive inflows of 
foreign resources in terms of loans, grants and transfers. This has increased 
Ghana's ability to import. In the short run, therefore, real devaluation is 
expected to have a positive impact on imports. In the longer run, however, the 
relative price increases for imports resulting from real devaluation could lead to 
the use of substitutes and hence a fall in imports. 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to examine the relationship between exchange rate 
policies and certain macroeconomic aggregates, particularly within the context 
of the current economic recovery programme. The analysis was based on a re- 
duced-form equation for real output to estimate the relationship between GDP 
and the real exchange rate. Real devaluation had an expansionary effect on GDP. 
The accompanying capital inflow led to an increase in imports. Growth in GDP 
was positively influenced by imports. These results would seem to indicate that, 
for such import-dependent economies, pursuing structural adjustment pro- 
grammes with devaluation as a major component increased external capital in- 
flow enhancing imports may be necessary for success. 
Real devaluation had a positive impact on both imports and exports. In an im- 
port-compressed economy the ensuing inflow of external resources can be ex- 
pected to lead to a positive relationship between imports and devaluation. 
Depending on the level of the increase, the trade balance could worsen. There 
was a significant feedback effect of imports on exports. 
Domestic export producer prices were significant in the export equations 
when they were substituted for world export prices. This suggests that in a regu- 
lated market system favourable world market prices may not be passed on to the 
producer. For cocoa, the marketing board prices may not reflect an improvement 
in the world market price. The cocoa results also suggest that exchange rate de- 
preciation which is not passed on as higher producer prices may actually have a 
contractionary effect on output. 
Our work shows the need for further analysis of questions of long-run sus- 
tainability of the programme, the social implications and replicability in other 
countries. 
Appendix 1 
Developments the value of the cedi 
July 1967 - Devaluation (Cl.02 = $1.00) 
December 1971 - Devaluation (Cl.82 = $1.00) 
February 1972 - Revaluation (NC1.28 = $1.00) 
February 1972 - The appellation "new" was dropped and the currency 
referred to as the cedi 
February 1973 to June 1978 - The cedi was allowed to appreciate in stages against the 
dollar when the dollar was devalued until the rate Cl. 15 = 
$1.00 was obtained 
August 1978 - Devaluation (C2.75 = $1.00) 
19 September 1986 - Two-tier exchange-rate system adopted. The rate at Window 
1 remained fixed at C90.00 = $1.00, while the Window 2 
rate was determined at a weekly foreign exchange auction 
February 1987 - Window 1 was abandoned and the marginal rate established 
at the weekly auction became the exchange rate for 
transactions for that week. 
Growth of GDP by kind of economic activity, 1975 prices (percent) 
Appendix 2 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity and water 
Construction 
Services 
Wholesale, retail, restaurants, 
hotels 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
Finance, insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Community, sociat and 
personal services 
Less imputed 
2.17 —2.56 —3.25 —9.11 9.71 
—1.85 —14.46 —16.67 —6.77 11.94 
—3.15 —7.34 —8.38 —13.64 13.49 
—1.44 —19.27 —20.49 —11.17 12.90 
12.86 11.86 —8.11 —38.91 42.96 
—7.44 —4.79 —91.15 27.43 2.33 
—2.79 2.73 —4.65 4.54 6.63 
—8.63 —1.92 —10.38 —5.26 10.15 
—13.24 6.76 1.13 7.26 12.76 
1.29 1.66 —1.38 14.12 9.26 
22.97 15.23 —4.99 7.09 20.10 
0.65 3.31 0.04 
17.60 7.56 11.34 
6.45 —3.03 7.89 
24.32 10.95 10.01 
20.73 18.03 18.73 
2.81 —2.66 15.02 
7.52 6.50 9.38 
13.68 9.02 17.45 
8.45 5.62 10.89 
2.58 7.66 5.48 
7.76 46.02 19.20 
bank charges 
Sub-total: Domestic 
production of industry 
Producers of Government 
services 
Producers of private non-profit 
services to household 
Domestic product excluding 
import duties 
Import duties 
Total gross domestic in 
purchaser's value 
1.12 0.41 —2.16 5.60 7.90 
—0.44 —3.85 —5.89 —6.12 10.35 
1.81 6.73 —4.15 5.94 0.44 
25.00 —17.45 21.15 —1.09 —6.62 
—0.09 —2.71 —5.55 —4.56 8.85 
—9.12 —34.08 —35.53 27.70 20.55 
—0.23 —3.18 —5.85 —4.34 8.96 
38.58 —22.16 19.34 
4.95 5.00 4.84 
18.75 22.17 1.96 
5.09 5.20 4.80 
7.84 5.72 9.58 
4.80 5.60 5.03 
4.65 2.35 2.97 
Source: Calculated from data obtained from IMF Financial Statistics and Quarterly Digest of 
Statistics, GSS, Accra, several years. 
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H-bar sq. 0.9086 0.7937 0.9109 
F 43.2363 22.8055 44.4629 
OW 2.6319 1.7054 2.2161 
List of Variables 
Y growth inGDP 
G ratio of government expenditure to GDP 
M unexpected money growth 
TOT terms of trade 
REER real effective exchange rate 
FD ratio of government deficit to GDP 
trend GDP 
X exports 
Px price of exports 
PT price of domestic tradeables 
Ph price of non-tradeables 
time 
MI Imported inputs 
Xs desired level of exports 
IMP import demand 
Fr foreign reserves 
TB trade balance 
Pm Price of imports 
tx export tax rate 
tm import duty rate 
REER (x) real effective exchange rate for exports 
REER (m) real effective exchange rate for imports 
GE Government expenditure 
C constant term 
Cpx producer price of cocoa 
M* money supply 
Appendix 4 
Notes 
1. The pound was devalued from 1: US$ 2.80 to US$ 2.40. 
2. The auction process involves users submitting sealed bids for foreign exchange at rates 
they wish to purchase them through their bankers to the Bank of Ghana. On Fridays, the 
Bank of Ghana opens the bids and allocates its foreign exchange supply for the week, start- 
ing with the highest bid. The rate at which the foreign exchange supply for the week is ex- 
hausted is declared the marginal rate for the week. 
3. Other policies include: 
(a) Operation of foreign exchange accounts with the local commercial banks; 
(b) The amount of foreign currency that can be taken out of the country on business trips 
may be up to a maximum of $3,000.00; 
(c) Import licenses have been abolished. 
4. Our attempt to eliminate the role of government expenditure in surprise money did not 
yield good results. 
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